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Abstract
It has long been debated whether the mind consists of specialized and independently evolving modules, or whether and to
what extent a general factor accounts for the variance in performance across different cognitive domains. In this study, we
used a hierarchical Bayesian model to re-analyse individual level data collected on seven primate species (chimpanzees,
bonobos, orangutans, gorillas, spider monkeys, brown capuchin monkeys and long-tailed macaques) across 17 tasks within
four domains (inhibition, memory, transposition and support). Our modelling approach evidenced the existence of both
a domain-specific factor and a species factor, each accounting for the same amount (17%) of the observed variance. In
contrast, inter-individual differences played a minimal role. These results support the hypothesis that the mind of primates is
(at least partially) modular, with domain-specific cognitive skills undergoing different evolutionary pressures in different
species in response to specific ecological and social demands.
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Introduction
One of the most consistent findings from individual-variability
research focusing on human cognitive abilities and disabilities is
that diverse cognitive processes interrelate even when they have
little in common (see [1] for a review). As first evidenced by
Spearman [2], individual performance in humans positively
correlates across different cognitive domains, with substantial
variation accounted for by a single factor. This single factor
accounting for most of the variance across domains has been
labelled G, or general factor of intelligence, and it appears to be
related to a variety of psychological, social, biological and genetic
factors, including brain volume and amounts of grey and white
matter [3,4]. More recently, the existence of a general factor
qualitatively and quantitatively analogous to G has also been
suggested in mice [5–12] (but see [13]). In these studies, a general
factor accounted for 23–44% of the variance in performance
across different cognitive domains, similarly to what was reported
for humans with G accounting for about 40% of the total variance
[1].
Some scientists have challenged the existence of G by claiming
that the mind consists either entirely or largely of specialized,
independently evolving modules [14–18]. Experimental evidence
in humans supporting this view ranges from precocious de-
velopment in some specific domains, to dissociable damage to
many (but not all) individual systems (reviewed in [14]). In
mammals, evidence of mosaic evolution in brain organization (i.e.
different cognitive skills having evolved independently in different
lineages) provides indirect support to this view [19,20]. From
a theoretical point of view, the modularity of mind can be
explained by domain-specific cognitive skills reflecting adaptations
to specific socio-ecological problems aimed to increase fitness in
taxon-typical environment [21–23]. In this respect, the mind
would consist of several specialized modules, each independently
evolved to solve specific problems [15,23–25].
An intermediate view considers the existence of G being
compatible with the existence of independent domain-specific
cognitive skills [1,26]. In humans, some properties of the brain,
such as the amount of grey matter and the neuronal speed of
transmission, have a general effect on different brain regions,
leading to correlations across performance in different domains
even if cognitive processes are localized in discrete regions [27–
31]. Because the link between brain measures and cognitive skills is
controversial (e.g. [32,33]), experimental support of this view is still
needed. Indeed, as soon as a reversal of performance in two
different domains between two species is found (e.g. species 1 does
better on task A than species 2, but species 2 does better on task B
than species 1), the existence of domain-specific cognitive skills can
be claimed. Since such events are rather common (e.g. [34]), it
seems that domain-specific abilities must logically exist. Then, the
real issue is how to best capture correlations across tasks and
estimate how much of the variance a common factor (G) can
explain.
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The question about whether and to what extent minds are
modular has been recently addressed in non-human primates.
These studies mainly investigated whether some individuals or
taxa consistently perform better than others across different
cognitive domains. For example, Deaner and colleagues [26] used
a hierarchical Bayesian model to compare the performance of 24
genera in several cognitive domains ranging from tool use to
memory and inhibition. In their study, genera performing better in
one domain performed better in many other domains, with a single
general factor accounting for approximately 85% of the variance.
Consequently, Deaner and colleagues [26] concluded that primate
taxa may differ in a general factor analogous to the human G.
Similarly, Reader and colleagues [35] compared 62 primate
species across a variety of domains including social learning,
tactical deception, tool use, innovation and extractive foraging.
Their results evidenced a single factor explaining over 65% of the
variance across domains and covarying with the general factor
from Deaner and colleagues [26]. The strong correlation between
distinct measures of primate cognitive performance led the authors
to conclude that cognitive skills in primates are not independent.
However, their study could not rule out that the primate mind
consists of distinct modules which have partially coevolved, nor
that modularity exist outside of the tested domains [35,36]. In
particular, independent cognitive skills might have undergone
correlated evolution by being subject to the same selective
pressures [26,37]. For example, the cognitive requirements of
group living might be linked to both enhanced social coordination
and analogical reasoning (e.g. [38,39]). Consequently, some taxa
might perform better across different domains simply because they
possess most of the few distinct but co-evolved skills, each of which
is required for such domains [26,35].
In a recent study, Schmitt and colleagues [40] experimentally
tested long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) and olive baboons
(Papio anubis) in a series of tasks on physical and social cognition
ranging from the understanding of spatial and causal relations to
the understanding of others’ intentions. They found that in-
terspecific differences could not be explained by a domain-general
factor, but rather at the domain-specific level. Schmitt and
colleagues [40] explained the differences with previous studies in
terms of the wider number of tasks and the same methods used for
all subjects. This last aspect is especially important, as direct
comparison of different species is fundamental to better un-
derstand how cognitive skills are distributed across species (e.g.
[41]). Other studies have addressed the topic of mind modularity
by focusing on inter-individual variability within a species. If some
individuals perform better in some domains, whereas other
individuals do so in other domains, the notion of modular minds
would be supported; on the contrary, if the same individuals
perform consistently better across all domains, a general factor
would be supported [26,42,43]. Herrmann and colleagues [44],
for example, used 15 physical and social domains to investigate
individual differences in the cognitive skills of human children and
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). In chimpanzees, one single factor was
not sufficient to account for the variance in performance across the
different domains, with performance being best explained by one
factor accounting for performance on spatial domains, another
factor accounting for performance on two physical and two social
domains, and no other factor accounting for performance in the
remaining domains [44]. In contrast, Banerjee and colleagues [45]
found evidence for a general factor when testing 22 cotton-top
tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) on different cognitive skills, including
inhibition and memory domains. Contrasting results have also
been reported for species other than primates, with a positive
association across individual performance in different cognitive
domains being shown in honey bees (Apis mellifera: [46]), but not in
song sparrows (Melospiza melodia: [47]), and only partially in satin
bowerbirds and mice (Ptilonorhynchus violaceus: [48]; mice: [8]).
The relative importance of G might be inflated by researchers
choosing experimental tasks which seem to require cognitive skills
from different domains, but are not sufficiently different from one
another. If tasks are even slightly similar, it is not surprising that
the performance across them is correlated. For example, although
mice are usually reported to have been tested on a battery of tasks
‘‘tapping diverse cognitive demands’’, the administered tasks are
basically all spatial (e.g. [7], p. 88). Another problem with studies
investigating domain-specific and general factors across species is
that data used in the analyses are often not at the individual level.
Analyses using data published in various articles, for example, can
include a large variety of tasks from different domains, but they
lose much information by using rank data at the genus or species
level, instead of data at the individual or trial level (e.g. [26]).
Consequently, the existence of individual-level effects cannot be
determined, the importance of G might be inflated, and the
existence of domain-specific effects might be harder to detect.
Moreover, these analyses rely on different studies which probably
have not used the same testing procedures for every species, so that
these analyses might detect inter-specific differences simply caused
by methodological differences.
In this study, we aimed to explore the existence of domain-
specific versus general factors accounting for the variance in
performance across different cognitive domains in seven primate
species. In particular, we investigated whether domain-specific
factors explained part of the variance in performance (consistent
with the view that the mind consists of specialized and at least
partially independently evolving modules), or whether and to what
extent a general factor accounts for the variance in performance
across the different domains. We developed a hierarchical
Bayesian model ad hoc using data at the individual level because
the Bayesian paradigm offers several advantages in this setting: it
affords great flexibility in modelling complicated interactions in
a hierarchical framework; it readily incorporates latent variables,
thereby facilitating comparisons across tasks with different types of
responses; and it allows us to handle rank data with ties in
a straightforward fashion, best permitting us to perform inference
based on the data at our disposal. In contrast, classical analyses
would require that we determine the sampling distributions of our
statistics (in repeated replications of the entire experimental
framework), which is not feasible for these data. If domain-specific
factors explained an important part of the variance in performance
across domains, we briefly discussed the possible evolutionary
pressures that might be linked to different domain-specific
cognitive skills in different species. We used data at the level of
individual subjects collected with comparable procedures on 19
chimpanzees, 5 bonobos (Pan paniscus), 10 orangutans (Pongo
pygmaeus), 8 gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), 18 spider monkeys (Ateles
geoffroyi), 27 brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and 12 long-
tailed macaques. These species differ in phylogenetic relatedness (4
great apes, 2 New and 1 Old World monkeys), and socio-
ecological characteristics (e.g. degree of frugivory: lower in gorillas;
fission-fusion dynamics: lower in gorillas, capuchin monkeys and
macaques; manipulatory skills: higher in Pan and capuchin
monkeys). If it is true that specific socio-ecological factors are
linked to the enhancement of specific cognitive skills (e.g. [23]),
then the selected species would enable us to examine the existence
of domain-specific factors. The administered tasks assessed
cognitive skills across a wide range of domains, including
inhibition (e.g. suppressing prepotent responses), memory (e.g.
retrieving hidden food after delay), transposition (e.g. keeping
The Primate Modular Mind
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track of invisible displacements) and support (e.g. understanding of
mean-end connections, by selecting the tool to which food is
attached). More than one task was used for each domain to




Animal husbandry and research comply with the ‘‘EAZA
Minimum Standards for the Accommodation and Care of Animals
in Zoos and Aquaria’’, the ‘‘WAZA Ethical Guidelines for the
Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquariums’’ and
the ‘‘Guidelines for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral
Research and Teaching’’ of the Association for the Study of
Animal Behavior (ASAB). Subjects were housed in large enclosures
and lived in well-established groups with conspecifics. They
participated in the tasks on a completely voluntary basis and were
never food or water deprived. Data collection consisted in the
administration of simple cognitive tasks, which were not invasive
and strictly adhered to the legal requirements of Germany,
Holland, Mexico and Italy, the countries were the primates were
housed. Subjects received extra food when correctly solving the
tasks and were never punished for incorrect performance. No
medical, toxicological or neurobiological research of any kind was
conducted on the subjects tested. All the protocols used in this
study were ethically approved by an internal committee at the
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Germany.
Permission to conduct research was also provided by all the other
facilities in which the tested primates were housed (the Centenario
Zoo in Merida, Mexico for the spider monkeys; the ISTC-CNR
Primate Centre in Rome, Italy for the capuchin monkeys; the
University of Utrecht, Netherland for the long-tailed macaques; no
permission IDs were given). Because our study was purely
behavioural/observational, no application to other ethic commit-
tees was required.
Subjects
The study subjects were sexually mature individuals of both
sexes and of various ages. Not all subjects were tested in each task,
but there were always a combination of sexes and ages (see Table
S1). To allow appropriate inter-specific comparisons, all subjects
but the spider monkeys had similar experience relevant to the
testing situation. Spider monkeys, which had never been tested
before in cognitive tasks, went through a longer habituation period
to the experimenter and the testing procedures (i.e. being longer
trained to enter the testing rooms, to be isolated during testing and
to retrieve the food provided from the experimenter out of any
experimental context). More information on the animals’ housing
conditions and rearing histories are in Supporting Information
(S1).
Administered Tasks
Detailed procedures of the experimental tasks are in Supporting
Information (S1) and in [49–51]. The basic testing procedure
consisted of presenting the subjects with two or more alternatives.
Tasks for the inhibition domain entailed subjects (i) refraining from
choosing the now empty opaque cup under which they previously
retrieved a reward (A not B task, or IN1), (ii) refraining from
choosing an empty opaque cup close to an opaque cup from which
they previously retrieved a reward (middle cup task, or IN2), (iii)
refraining from reaching toward a reward directly through
a plexiglas panel and instead taking a detour movement through
one hole (plexiglas hole task, or IN3), (iv) refraining from reaching
toward a reward directly through a transparent door and instead
taking a detour movement through another transparent door to
grab the reward from behind (swing door task, or IN4), or (v)
refraining from reaching for a smaller immediate reward to obtain
a larger delayed one (delay of gratification task, or IN5). For the
memory domain, subjects had to retrieve food from under one of
three opaque cups after (i) 30 seconds (ME1) or (ii) 30 minutes
(ME2). For the transposition domain subjects had to retrieve food
under one of three opaque cups after their location had been
switched. The transposition tasks consisted in (i) the baited cup
switching location with another cup while the third cup remained
stationary (TR1), (ii) the baited cup switching location with
another cup and then again with the third cup (TR2), (iii) the
baited cup switching location with another cup twice, returning to
its original location (TR3), or (iv) the unbaited cups switching
location while the baited cup remained stationary (TR4). For the
support domain subjects had to select between two cloth pieces/
strings and pull the one which was attached to the reward.
Subjects should select (i) the large cloth piece with a reward on top
instead of the large cloth piece with a reward close by (SU1), (ii)
the large cloth piece with a reward on top instead of a combination
of two small cloth pieces, the accessible of which had no reward on
top (SU2), (iii) the large cloth piece under a bridge, with a reward
on top of the cloth and under the bridge instead of the large cloth
piece under a bridge, with a reward on top of the bridge (SU3), or
the long string with a reward on top instead of a combination of
two short strings, the accessible of which had no reward on top,
with the two strings being (iv) divided by a little gap (SU4), (v)
slightly overlapping (SU5) or (vi) adjacent (SU6). The effect of
motivation was controlled by using control conditions whenever
appropriate [49,50]. Moreover, no tasks that could bias the results
in favour of specific taxa (i.e. requiring enhanced manual or visual
skills) were used.
Assignment of Tasks to the Different Domains
Tasks were assigned to the different domains, according to
existing literature (e.g. [25]; also see [49–51]). However, we also
checked the adequacy of this traditional task assignment using
additional discrepancy measures (see the Data analysis section for
more details on the statistical procedure). Note that this analysis
was aimed at verifying the adequacy of our pre-specified
assignment (confirmatory analysis), not at identifying the ‘‘opti-
mal’’ assignment (exploratory analysis), because (i) we did not have
an independent data set to evaluate the assignment of tasks to
domains, and (ii) we did not want to ignore existing literature when
assigning tasks to different domains. The upper bound of the prior-
predictive-posterior (PPP) p-value (see [52,53]) checking if the
assignment of the 17 tasks to the 4 domains was inadequate was
0.02, which is consistent with what would be expected from a series
of minor misassignments.
For exploratory purposes, we therefore assigned the 17 tasks to
6 different domains. In particular, the inhibition domain was split
in two different domains, one including the A not B task (IN1), the
middle cup task (IN2) and the delay of gratification task (IN5), and
the other one including the plexiglas hole task (IN3) and the swing
door task (IN4). Similarly, the memory domain was split in two
different domains, one including the 30 seconds memory task
(ME1), and one including the 30 minutes memory task (ME2). The
rational of this new task assignment was that (i) only in the IN3 and
IN4 tasks was plexiglas used in the set-up, and plexiglas is
notoriously a confounding factor for several species, the un-
derstanding of whose properties might involve cognitive skills of
a different domain (e.g. [54]); (ii) the two memory tasks assess
short-term and long-term memory, which are thought to belong to
The Primate Modular Mind
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 December 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 12 | e51918
two different memory systems (e.g. [55]). This new task assignment
was checked for the assignment’s adequacy. The upper bound of
the PPP p-value was 0.11, suggesting that although the task
assignment might still not be optimal it was good enough given the
large quantity of data that were fitted to the model.
Despite these results, we preferred to use the first assignment of
tasks to 4 domains because (i) only a much larger independent data
set would make us feel comfortable enough to defy the traditional
assignment of tasks; (ii) an innovative assignment of tasks would
best be done with exploratory factor analysis, which our dataset
does not allow, aimed to specifically identify the ‘‘optimal’’
assignment of tasks to domains; (iii) the assignment of tasks to 6
domains was not radically different from the first one, suggesting
that although the task assignment we adopted might not have been
optimal, no radical changes would anyway be needed to improve
the model’s adequacy; and (iv) the 0.02 upper bound of the PPP p-
value for the task assignment to 4 domains was still acceptable
considering that with the large amount of individual data minor
discrepancies might be statistically significant.
Data Analysi
For the analyses, we used the ratio between the percentage of
correct choices in the experimental and in the control trials (for
each subject, 1 trial in IN1, 2 trials in IN2), the percentage of
correct choices in the experimental trials (2 trials in IN3, TR1 and
TR2; 10 trials in IN4; 3 trials in ME1 and ME2; 1 trial in TR3
and TR4; 6 trials in SU1, SU2, SU3, SU4, SU5, SU6) and the
indifference pointed reached IN5 (i.e. when the smaller and larger
rewards were equally valued) as in Amici and colleagues [49,50].
The mean value and standard deviation for each species and task
are reported in Table S2. The data used in this study have been
already published to address specific questions [49–51,56–58] with
the exception of three tasks in the support domain. For the
purpose of this study, we re-analysed them with a hierarchical
Bayesian modelling approach, using binomial data for each trial
whenever possible (all tasks except IN1, IN2 and IN5) to avoid loss
of information (i.e. how an individual performs, instead of simply
the rank order of performance at the species level as used in other
studies). Our modelling approach allowed us to estimate the
amount of variation across the four domains explained by inter-
specific differences, which would be interpreted as G.
For the Bayesian modelling, each response on the 17 tasks was
assumed to have an underlying latent variable on a continuous
scale. This was done to create a more parsimonious model which is
amenable to model estimation and comparisons across models and
across tasks. The latent variables were modelled with varying
degrees of complexity to find a balance between model adequacy
and model parsimony. Normally distributed latent performance
variables were assumed to determine the observed performance
for both the binomial [59] and rank response tasks [60]. In our
study, these latent variables were assumed to be affected by up to
four random effects: species effects (i.e. G), individual effects,
species*domain effects (i.e. domain-specific cognitive modules) and
individual*domain effects. These effects were included as random
effects, implying that their importance could be assessed by the
proportion of the total variance of the latent variables for which
they account. In addition, recognizing that none of the models
would be expected to perfectly explain subjects’ performance, we
included an error term in the latent variable model. The error
term was either assumed to have the same variance for each task
or allowed to have a task-specific variance hierarchically based on
a common error variance.
We formally assessed the adequacy of the various models by
computing discrepancy measures (based on [52,53]), goodness-of-
fit quantities that we customized based on the selected model
assumption. Model assumptions that were investigated include
that no additional random effects were needed, that error
variances were the same for all tasks, and that the assignment of
tasks to domains was adequate (see above). Each discrepancy
measure tends to be larger compared to a reference distribution
when the measure’s targeted assumption is violated. The
discrepancy measure was compared to a reference distribution
to assess the evidence against the model assumption. From the
discrepancy measures, we identified an upper bound on the PPP p-
value. The actual p-value was exceedingly difficult to obtain, but
the upper bound was feasible to compute. For these upper bounds,
a value larger than the traditional 0.05 should be used to indicate
significance, such as 0.25 [53]. Each candidate model was fitted
using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm with at least 50,000
burn-in iterations and then at least 3,000,000 more iterations to
obtain precise estimates. More details on the statistical procedures
can be found in the Supporting Information (S1) and in Barney
[61].
Results
Table 1 reports the estimated proportion of total variance due
to each effect for the various models. The simplest model with no
random effects M0 (0,0) was inadequate because the discrepancy
measure designed to identify species effects indicated a significant
lack of fit. Similarly, we found that the model that included only
the species effect M1 (S,0) was inadequate because the discrepancy
measure designed to identify species*domain effects gave strong
statistical evidence of a species*domain effect. Including species
effects and individual effects also resulted in a model M5 (SI,0)
with significant lack of fit, due to the omission of species*domain
effects. The model with species and species*domain effects M3
(SD,0) did not indicate significant lack of fit stemming from the
omission of individual effects. Also, this model (and all other
random effects specifications considered) did not indicate a model
inadequacy due to the assumption that each task has the same
error variance. Indeed, every pair of models (with and without the
assumption of constant variance) yielded similar inferences on the
relative importance of each effect to explain latent performance.
The best model was therefore M3 (SD,0), with species and
species*domain effects and a common error variance for the latent
variables of all tasks (Table 1). In the best model, both the species
and the species*domain effect were estimated to explain 17% of
the variance, with the error term accounting for 66% of the
variance. Because different experimenters tested different species,
the species*domain effect could be influenced by the confounding
effect of different experimenters. In order to control for this
possible confounding effect, we rerun the analyses only including
the 3 monkey species tested by the same experimenter (the first
author) and found that the amount of variance explained by
species*domain effects (13%) was similar to that of the original
analysis based on the seven species.
The simpler models were inadequate because they excluded
either species or species*domain effects, both of which were
necessary based on the discrepancy measures and the considerable
proportion of the variance attributed to each. The more complex
model with species, species*domain, individual and individual*-
domain effects M7 (SDID,0) did not seem necessary (i) because the
discrepancy measure did not even detect individual effects should
have been added to M3 (SD,0), and (ii) because the individual and
individual*domain effects were estimated to account together for
less than 4% of the total variance (M5–M8 in Table 1).
The Primate Modular Mind
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The combined species and species*domain effects do not display
the same pattern of inter-specific differences for each domain
(Figures 1 and 2; only posterior probabilities.0.99 are reported in
the text below). In the support domain, spider monkeys’
performance was better relative to that of all other species than
expected based on the performance in the other domains, and Pan
species and capuchin monkeys performed better than macaques.
In the transposition domain, Pan species’ performance was better
relative to that of the three monkey species than expected based on
the performance in the other domains. Bonobos performed better
than orangutans, orangutans and macaques better than capuchin
monkeys, and gorillas better than spider and capuchin monkeys.
In the inhibition domain, orangutans’ performance was better
relative to that of all other species than expected based on the
performance in the other domains, and all other species performed
better than macaques. In addition, chimpanzees performed better
than gorillas, and the two Pan species and spider monkeys
performed better than capuchin monkeys. In the memory domain,
Pan species performance was better relative to that of gorillas,
orangutans, capuchin monkeys and macaques than expected
based on the performance in the other domains. Spider monkeys
and gorillas performed better than capuchin monkeys and
macaques.
To assess whether other studies may have failed to detect
species*domain effects simply due to the way data were used, we
also modelled ranks of species-level means (instead of rank data
and binomial data at the trial level for each individual). The results
of these analyses are consistent with our previous results: the best
model included species effects and species*domain effects, with
each effect accounting for an estimated 24% and 32% of the total
variance in the latent variables, respectively. In this case, the
species and species*domain effects appear to be more prominent,
probably because the variance attributable to what is left over in
the model (‘‘pure error’’) is relatively less influential for averages
than for individual data.
Discussion
In this study, both the species and the species*domain effect
were estimated to explain 17% of the variance in performance.
The same pattern of results was obtained when analysing rank
data at the species level as in other studies. The error term
accounted for 66% of the observed variance, whereas individual
and individual*domain effects needed not be included to explain
the observed variance. These results support the idea that a single
general factor cannot alone explain the variance in performance
across different domains, and that the mind of primates is (at least
partially) modular, with domain-specific cognitive skills undergo-
ing different evolutionary pressures in different species in response
to specific ecological and social demands.
Some species performed better than others in some, but not all,
domains. In the support domain, for example, spider monkeys
performed much better than the other six primates, which is
consistent with Harlow & Settlage’s [62] findings based on the
comparison of nine primate species. The spider monkeys’
impressive performance has been explained in terms of their
relative high degree of fission–fusion dynamics [50]. A high degree
of fission-fusion dynamics occurs when group members often split
and merge in subgroups of flexible membership [63]. This results
in group members potentially being apart for extended periods
and therefore dealing with especially fragmented social informa-
tion. Such individuals would have then to retain much ‘‘off-line’’
information and would especially benefit from an enhanced ability
to better understand relations between relations (i.e. analogical
reasoning) and reduce the cognitive load [39,63]. In the support
domain, the enhancement of these abilities could result in species
with higher levels of fission–fusion dynamics to better understand
the physical relationship between a functional tool and the food in
one task, and extend this knowledge to other tasks [50].
Orangutans performed especially well in the inhibition domain,
which is consistent with orangutans having a relatively large
orbital frontal cortex, a brain area associated with inhibitory skills
[64,65]. Orangutans’ performance in inhibitory tasks has already
been linked to their extremely dispersed social system which
reduces direct individual food competition and might be linked to
orangutans being less impulsive and thus better able to assess
situations before acting [49,58]. In addition, bonobos and
chimpanzees performed similarly across all domains, and great
Table 1. Posterior mean (6 standard deviation) of variance proportions by source for all models considered. M3 is the best model.








M1 (S,0) 0.8760.07 0.1360.07
M2 (S,J) 0.8660.08 0.1460.08
M3 (SD,0) 0.6660.08 0.1760.09 0.1760.06
M4 (SD,J) 0.6760.08 0.1660.09 0.1660.06
M5 (SI,0) 0.8760.07 0.1260.07 0.0160.01
M6 (SI,J) 0.8560.07 0.1460.07 0.0260.01
M7 (SDID,0) 0.6760.07 0.1560.08 0.1660.05 0.0160.01 0.0260.01
M8 (SDID,J) 0.6760.07 0.1460.08 0.1660.05 0.0160.01 0.0360.01
M0, M1, M3, M5 and M7 assume that the error variance is identical across tasks (0), while M2, M4, M6 and M8 allow the error variance to have a task-specific variance
hierarchically based on a common error variance (J). M0 includes no random effects. M1 and M2 only include the species effect (S). M3 and M4 include species and
species*domain effects (SD). M5 and M6 include species and individual effects (SI). M7 and M8 include species, species*domain, individual and individual*domain effects
(SDID). Models M0–M2 and M5–M6 had significant lack of fit because of their failure to include both species and species*domain effects; this is also reflected in the
sizable proportion of variance that both the species and species*domain effects account for whenever they were included in these models (i.e. M3–M4 and M7–M8). The
principal conclusions drawn from M3 are similar to those from M4, M7, and M8. Because the discrepancy measures did not suggest that M3 needed individual effects (as
in M7 and M8) or that the error variances needed to deviate per task (as in M4), M3 was the best model (see [60] for a formal assessment approach).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0051918.t001
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apes did not overall outperform the three monkey species
(similarly, see [40]).
The importance of domain-specific factors in our study appears
to contrast with Deaner and colleagues’ [26] lack of evidence of an
interaction between genus and domain. Several reasons may
account for this difference. First, our study assessed primate
cognitive performance using data at the individual level for each
task, whereas Deaner and colleagues [26] used data from different
studies and thus had to rank data at the genus level for modelling.
One could therefore argue that our study relied on more precise
information. This explanation, however, was not supported by us
re-running the analyses with models using ranks of species level
means as the results did not substantially change. Second, our
study included fewer species than Deaner and colleagues [26], and
crucially, their performance was distributed more narrowly than
those included in Deaner and colleagues’ [26] study. In fact, our
study included species whose overall cognitive performance was
among the best according to Deaner and colleagues’ [26]
comparison across 24 primate genera. Although a narrower range
in performance may have contributed to reduce the likelihood of
finding a G factor, it is also possible that the greater species
homogeneity in our sample could have had the opposite effect, and
contributed it to promote the appearance of G. Therefore
a narrower range, either in terms of species or their performance,
does not seem a satisfactory explanation for the difference between
the studies. Third, the studies may have produced different results
due to differences in the domains included. Deaner and colleagues
[26], for example, did not include tasks in the inhibition domain
(with the only exception of the reversal learning task, the ability of
which in measuring inhibitory skills is however controversial:
[66,67]), but they did include tool use and object-discrimination
learning domains, in which great apes notoriously perform better
than other species (e.g. [25]). Moreover, our tasks had been
especially designed to allow inter-specific comparisons, so that the
tasks were as basic as possible and subjects were not required to
understand complex contingencies of the tasks, reducing the role
played by other cognitive skills when assessing how subjects
performed on the selected cognitive skills. Fourth, in our study the
seven species were tested on a similar range of domains, whereas
Deaner and colleagues [26] had to rely on published data, which
were not evenly distributed across species. As a consequence,
domain-specific effects might have been more easily detected in
our study because more data were available on all tasks that were
tested across all the species. In this respect, selecting basic tasks
that address an array of cognitive skills belonging to a wide range
of domains and systematically administering them to all study
species might allow the detection of domain-specific effects that
would otherwise be ‘‘masked’’. Great apes, for example, do indeed
perform better than most monkeys in most domains, but not in all
domains. The lack of data on a wide range of domains for each
species may conceal the role played by domain-specific factors.
Based on our analyses, the species effect accounts for an
estimated 17% of the variance in latent performance across
different cognitive domains. One explanation for the co-existence
of the species effect with the domain-specific effect is that even if
specific cognitive processes are localized in discrete brain regions,
reflecting the taxon’s specific adaptations to particular ecological
problems, some properties of the brain, such as the amount of grey
matter, are intercorrelated across brain regions, possibly affecting
all cognitive domains [1,28–31,68]. For example, Lee [28]
proposed that more synaptic connections might enhance the
overall processing power of the brain, regardless of the brain
regions involved. This is not in contrast with the view that specific
cognitive processes are localized in discrete brain regions and
Figure 1. The estimated marginal posterior distributions of the combined species and species*domain effects for each species in
each domain. They convey the uncertainty in the combined effects of both domain-general and domain-specific factors. Larger average values of
a latent variable increase the likelihood of good performance, and narrower curves reflect greater precision in identifying the combined effects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0051918.g001
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reflect responses to specific ecological and social demands, as
having more synaptic connections and specific cognitive processes
in discrete brain regions are two different characteristics of the
brain, which are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, it is conceiv-
able that some basic cognitive skills (such as memory and object
permanence) are at play in all the domains (see e.g. [69] for
a review on the relationship between working memory and G).
Indeed, it seems hard to conceive single cognitive domains in
which only one cognitive skill is required. The species effect we
found in our study might thus be due to some (independently
evolved) cognitive skills being usually needed in all tasks and
domains, like working memory. At the moment, our data do not
allow us to understand to what extent the species effect is a pure
indicator of G. This is because, although we have selected tasks
which are widely considered to require specific cognitive skills, we
cannot rule out that the tasks required partially overlapping
cognitive skills belonging to different domains. Still, we showed the
presence of domain-specific factors and that the co-existence of
domain-specific and domain-general factors is possible, as other
studies also suggest (e.g. [8]).
In our study, the error term accounted for 66% of the observed
variance. This is not surprising if we consider that performance in
cognitive tasks is only a crude representation of cognitive skills,
introducing an important loss of information and enhancing the
contribution of error in our model. Moreover, the contribution of
the error is of course more apparent for individual-level
observations (like those used in our study) than for species-level
averages (like, for example, those used by Deaner and colleagues
[26]).
In our study, inter-individual differences within species played
a minimal role. When we added individual and individual*domain
effects to the model, they were estimated to explain together less
than 4% of the total variance in latent performance. This suggests
that there was substantially more systematic inter-specific variation
than systematic intra-specific variation in terms of cognitive
performance in the seven tested primate species, with inter-
individual differences possibly playing a more limited role than in
humans (e.g. [68]). One consequence of this result is that the
taxonomic differences detected in our study are not merely the
consequence of measurements collected from a few exceptional
individuals (cf. [26]). It is however possible that studies including
more individuals will find larger inter-individual variation than
reported here.
Figure 2. For each domain, image plots of the posterior probability (PP) that the listed row species performed better than the listed
column species on average (CH=chimpanzees, BO=bonobos, GO=gorilla, OR=orangutans, SM= spider monkeys, CM=capuchin
monkeys, LM= long-tailed macaques). Values close to 0 (pink shade) indicate the row species perform worse than the column species, whereas
values close to 1 (green shade) indicate the row species perform better than the column species. The plots more directly reflect the evidence for
differences between species in the combined effects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0051918.g002
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Because multiple researchers collected the data, the results
could have been affected by an experimenter effect. Indeed, there
was a high degree of confounding between the experimenter and
the species and species*domain effects. For example, all assess-
ments from the three monkey species were conducted by the same
experimenter, and four of the six experimenters collected data
from only one domain. Therefore, the confounding between the
experimenter effect and the species and species*domain effects was
too severe to be reliably assessed directly. When we rerun the
analyses only including the 3 monkey species, so controlling for the
possible confounding experimenter effect, we found that similar
results to those of the analysis based on the seven species. Thus,
our results seem solid, although we could not fully control for the
experimenter effect.
In conclusion, our results provide evidence for the existence of
a modular mind in primates, with possibly several specialized
modules having independently evolved as a response to different
selective pressures [15,23–25,40]. Interestingly, our results might
also explain why, despite the importance of domain-specific
effects, great apes have often outperformed monkeys. Great apes
might indeed perform better than most monkeys in most (but not
all) domains, and using complex tasks requiring cognitive skills
from multiple domains might more probably involve also one of
those skills which are especially enhanced in great apes, but not in
other species, preventing the detection of previously unreported
domain-specific effects. It is therefore desirable that researchers
coordinate their efforts to agree on simple standardized methods to
test a wide range of cognitive skills from different domains [41], in
order to better address the question of modularity through the use
of a large data-set including numerous species differing in socio-
ecological characteristics, phylogenetic relatedness and other
relevant characteristics.
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